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Abstract
We develop a theory of policy implementation and elections that examines the con-
ditions under which observable policy sabotage—that is, the deliberate choice by an
opposition party to block the implementation of a policy—can be an effective electoral
strategy. From the perspective of theoretical models of accountability, such behavior
poses a puzzle: how can observable sabotage succeed, when rational voters can update
on its deployment as a strategy? In our model, a potential saboteur chooses whether
to sabotage an incumbent’s policy by blocking its implementation. Following this de-
cision, a voter decides whether to retain the incumbent, who is of unknown quality, or
to select a challenger. We find that the incentives for sabotage are broadly shaped by
the underlying popularity of the incumbent—it is most attractive when an incumbent
is moderately unpopular. If so, sabotage may decrease the probability the incumbent
is re-elected, even though sabotage is observable to the voter. This occurs because
sabotage prevents the voter from using policy outcomes to update her beliefs about
the incumbent’s type, which in some cases will lead to voter to choose the challenger.
We illustrate our theory with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act since its
passage in 2010.
∗We thank Peter Buisseret and Craig Volden for helpful comments and suggestions.
The Democrats ObamaCare is imploding. Massive subsidy
payments to their pet insurance companies has stopped. Dems
should call me to fix!
—Donald Trump (Tweet from 10/13/2017)
I can’t stand rockin’ when I’m in here, Cause your crystal ball ain’t
so crystal clear.
—The Beastie Boys
1 Introduction
A central tension in democratic theory is how imperfectly informed voters can either select
representatives who act in the best interest of voters, or sanction representatives who do not
(Fearon 1999). To address this tension, political scientists and economists have developed
an extensive literature that employs the theory of political agency to understand how and
why reelection-minded representatives may choose to act in the best interests of voters, even
if voters can only imperfectly observe whether representatives are actually doing so.1
While the nuances of various theories differ, a ubiquitous theme of models of selection
and accountability is that voters condition their retention choice on the observable actions of
politicians. This makes perfect sense, as voters should use all pertinent, available information
at their disposal—in particular, policy outcomes. Given this, in a world in which one party
seamlessly controls policy (such as in parliamentary system with a sizable majority party), we
would expect the leading party to avoid observable actions (as opposed to hidden decisions)
that decrease the chance of a successful policy outcome. Yet, in a context where power is more
fragmented, either because of institutional-based gridlock and/or party-based polarization,
the motivations of competing parties are more complicated.
In particular, the current era of partisan polarization in the United States has seen a
apparent increase in the incidence of politicians engaging in “policy sabotage”—the deliber-
ate effort to hurt the implementation of a policy passed and implemented by the opposition
party, in an effort to help the out party’s fortunes at the ballot box. Most notably, since 2010
1See Ashworth (2012) for an outstanding review of this literature.
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Congressional Republicans have exerted a great deal of effort to undermine the implementa-
tion of the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), an effort joined with full gusto by President
Trump since taking office in 2017. Moreover, as the quoted tweet above indicates, Trump
and his fellow Republicans have not been shy about their intentions.2 And, these actions
have had policy consequences, with experts predicting higher rates of uninsured Americans
and higher average premiums (Blumberg and Wang 2018.).
From the perspective of theoretical models of accountability, this behavior poses a puzzle:
why is observable sabotage a (potentially) electorally effective strategy when rational voters
can observe sabotage and update on its deployment as a strategy? In this paper, we present a
formal theory of policy sabotage that explores this question. We develop a two-period model
in which a voter chooses to either re-elect a incumbent or replace him with a challenger.
Incumbents and challengers are each associated with an ideal spatial policy, and can be
either low quality or high quality. This level of quality, which is not known to the voters,
affects the probability that a policy will translate into a successful outcome.
The key innovation of the model is that there is a potential “saboteur” who can interfere
with implementation of policy. The saboteur could be conceptualized as a bureaucrat or
an out-party, depending on the relevant context. Specifically, the saboteur can choose to
let the policy be implemented, which means that the policy will succeed with some positive
probability that is based on the incumbent’s type. Alternatively, the saboteur can sabotage
the policy, in which case it will deterministically fail.3 Importantly, we assume that both
implementing and sabotaging the policy are costless; this means the decision of whether to
engage in sabotage is not one related to costly effort.
The voter and the saboteur are the strategic players in the model. For simplicity, we
assume that the incumbent and challenger are non-strategic and passively committed to
2The tweet in was in reference to the administration’s decision in October 2017 to cut off billions of
dollars in subsidies to insurers who enroll Americans through Obamacare—the subsidies were designed to
help lower out-of-pocket expenses for low-income enrollees in the program (Pear, Haberman and Abelson
2017).
3We can also characterize the saboteur’s decisions as either “interfering” or “not interfering” with the
implementation of the policy.
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their ideal policies. Thus, the likelihood of policy success depends on their types rather than
any sort of effort decision. (In practice, this means the model is one of selection with respect
to the incumbent policymaker, not accountability.) Importantly, in addition to ideology,
both the voter and the saboteur have a shared preference for successful outcomes; in other
words, both players have valence utility as well as spatial utility. The voter is assumed
to have prior beliefs about the incumbent’s type, but is not perfectly informed. She can,
however, update her beliefs based on the policy outcome (success or failure) as well as the
saboteur’s decision over whether to engage in sabotage. Following the realization of the
outcome in the first period, the voter chooses whether to retain the incumbent or replace
him with a challenger. The game then repeats in the second period.
We present two versions of the model that differ in the information available to the
saboteur. In the first version, the saboteur does not know the incumbent’s type, and thus
holds the same uncertainty as the voter. We call this an uninformed saboteur. In the second
version, we assume the saboteur knows the incumbent’s type. This assumption, which we
denote the informed saboteur, is more viable if one believes that actors in government are
better informed than voters about the quality of fellow policymakers.
The saboteur’s dilemma is as follows. Assume he is ideologically closer to the challenger
than the incumbent. Because sabotage always produces policy failure, the saboteur may be
incentivized to engage in sabotage because doing so prevents the voter from learning about
the incumbent’s quality from policy outcomes. Thus, such a blocking maneuver may increase
the chance that the voter chooses to replace the incumbent with the challenger—but only
under circumstances we discuss shortly. However, because the saboteur also cares about the
ultimate success of the policy, his concerns for successful outcomes may push him in the
opposite direction—especially because implementing the policy is costless.
The voter’s dilemma is as follows. Suppose first that the voter believes the saboteur
to be uninformed about the incumbent’s type, which is the simpler case. Then observing
a policy success (which, recall, can only occur in the absence of sabotage) increases the
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voter’s belief that the incumbent of high quality—but only probabilistically. Sabotage, on
the other hand, prevents any learning from policy implementation from occurring because it
blocks successful implementation for sure. Thus, whether the incumbent chooses to sabotage
depends on whether he is willing to sacrifice a policy success to suppress the voter’s ability
to learn about the incumbent’s quality through policy outcomes.
The voter’s inferences, however, are much more complex when he also believes the sabo-
teur to be privately informed about the incumbent’s quality. In this case, sabotage (and its
absence) also directly signals information about the incumbent’s quality. If, for example,
the voter believes the saboteur to be sabotaging a high quality incumbent to block the voter
from learning this fact, then he will infer from sabotage itself that the incumbent is high
quality and re-elect him; thus, sabotage will backfire. Conversely, if the voter believes the
saboteur to be sabotaging low quality incumbents to signal that he is low quality, then sab-
otage will harm the incumbent’s prospects, which will incentivize the saboteur to sabotage
the incumbent regardless of his quality. Thus, it is not obvious a priori whether sabotage
will signal in equilibrium that the incumbent is high or low quality. As it turns out, both
possibilities may obtain depending on the parameters, and the equilibrium.
Before summarizing the results of the model, it is useful to separate incumbents into
broad categories based on the primitive parameters. First, we define incumbents as popular
or unpopular : popular incumbents are those for whom the voter’s prior is sufficiently high
that they would re-elect in the absence of any additional information. Unpopular incumbents
are those for whom the voter’s prior is sufficiently low that they would vote out the incumbent
in the absence of any additional information. Within these categories, we then divide the
incumbent categories into “very” and “somewhat” popular and unpopular, based on the
inferences the voter would make from each policy outcome if she believed the bureaucrat’s
decision not to sabotage to be uninformative about the incumbent’s type. A very popular
incumbent is one who would certainly be re-elected in the absence of sabotage even if the
policy fails. A somewhat popular incumbent is one who would be retained after sabotage,
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but would be replaced in its absence if he also failed. A somewhat unpopular incumbent is
one who would be replaced after sabotage, but would be retained in its absence if he also
succeeded. Finally, a very unpopular incumbent is one who would be replaced even if he
succeeded (which implies the absence of sabotage).
Turning to the main results, first consider the case where the saboteur is uninformed
about the incumbent’s type. Here the results are straightforward. Suppose the incumbent
is either very or somewhat popular. In this scenario, there is no point in the saboteur
engaging in sabotage, since the voter would then just retain on the basis of her prior. He
will choose to implement the policy in order to capture the valence utility (in expectation).
If the incumbent is very unpopular, the outcome is the same but for the reverse reason: since
the incumbent will certainly lose even if he succeeds, the saboteur also has no incentive to
engage in sabotage. Only when the incumbent is somewhat unpopular will the uninformed
saboteur engage in sabotage. Why? Because the saboteur is uninformed, sabotage prevents
the voter from learning anything new about the incumbent’s type, and thus she sticks with
her prior beliefs and chooses the challenger.
Next, consider the scenario where the saboteur is informed about the incumbent’s type.
Here the results are more nuanced. First, consider the case of a very popular incumbent.
The unique equilibrium that survives refinement is one in which the saboteur employs a
mixed strategy: he always sabotages a low quality incumbent, and sometimes sabotage a
high quality incumbent. Specifically, he sabotages a high quality incumbent only to the
extent that sabotage is a credible but imperfectly informative signal that the incumbent is
low quality that will lead the voter to replace the incumbent probabilistically. Conversely,
implementation is a perfect signal that the incumbent is high quality, so the voter will
retain regardless of the outcome. Interestingly and perhaps counterintuitively, there does
not exist a pooling equilibrium satisfying refinement D1 in which the saboteur never engages
in sabotage (this is, as we explain below, due to the nature of off-path beliefs).
Second, consider the case of a somewhat popular incumbent. In contrast to the very
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popular scenario, pooling on implementation is an equilibrium that survives refinement D1,
and the Pareto dominant one. Why? When the incumbent is only somewhat popular, failure
leads to replacement. This key difference creates a greater incentive for the saboteur to
sabotage a high-quality incumbent than a low-quality one, since the high-quality incumbent
is more likely to avoid failure and be re-elected. This in turns means that if the saboteur
were to deviate from implementation to sabotage, this would be interpreted by the voter as
a signal that the incumbent is high-quality, causing sabotage to backfire and the voter to
retain. The saboteur thus avoids sabotage, knowing that it will not achieve his goals because
the voter understands his motives. (There are other equilibria in this scenario, but pooling
on not sabotaging dominates on Pareto grounds.)
Third, consider the case of a somewhat unpopular incumbent. This is perhaps the most
interesting case, with three plausible equilibria. The first is pooling on sabotage, which is
an equilibrium for the same reasons as when the saboteur is uninformed. The second is
pooling on implementation, which is an equilibrium for the same reasons as in the previ-
ous paragraph. The third involves the saboteur probabilistically sabotaging both low and
high-quality incumbents, with a greater probability on the latter. Sabotage thus perversely
helps in the incumbent’s reputation, leading the voter to retain with an interior probability.
Conversely, the absence of sabotage harms the incumbent’s reputation, since the voter un-
derstands that the bureaucrat is partially motivated to allow low-quality incumbents to fail.
A subsequent success is sufficient to overcome that harm—leading the voter to also retain
with an interior probability (higher than after sabotage)—while a subsequent failure leads
to replacement for sure. Interestingly, there is no natural welfare ordering among the three
equilibria. Pooling on sabotage is best for the saboteur and worst for the voter. Pooling
on implementation is worst for the saboteur and best for the voter. The partial-pooling
equilibrium is intermediate for both.
Finally, consider the case of a very unpopular incumbent. Here the logic is the same as
when the saboteur is uninformed: there is no incentive for him to engage in sabotage since the
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challenger will be elected even if the policy succeeds, and hence pooling on implementation
is an equilibrium.
Though our paper is the first (to the best of our knowledge) to directly model the sabotage
choice, it it connected to several related models in the accountability literature (e.g. Ashworth
and De Mesquita 2014). The closest analogue is Buisseret (2016), who develops a model with
a proposer, a veto player, and a voter. Buisseret uses the model to examine the difference
between political system in which competing factions are jointly appointed by voters (such
as parliamentary systems, where a “single electoral decision by each voter determines the
composition of both the executive and the legislature” (Buisseret 2016, 542)) or separately
appointed (such as in presidential systems). He finds that joint appointment institutions
reduce the incentives for the veto player to engage in obstruction, thereby improving voter
welfare. Conversely, in separate systems—such as that used in the United States—veto
players are more incentivized to engage in obstruction in order to establish a reputation for
competence. While the mechanics of our theory differ from Buisseret, our model can be seen
as extending his theory’s insights into when policy obstruction is rational for a competing
party or politician.4
In addition, our paper complements research on the role of challengers in democratic
accountability. As Shotts and Ashworth (2015) note, most theories of accountability feature
“passive” challengers who simply exist as alternatives to the incumbent (see e.g. Ferejohn
1986, Gordon and Huber 2002, Maskin and Tirole 2004, Ashworth and Mesquita 2008, Ash-
worth and De Mesquita 2014). In other papers, challengers do take affirmative yet limited
actions, such as entering the race as an alternative to the incumbent and/or declaring a
competing platform (see e.g. Epstein and Zemsky. 1995, Goodliffe 2005, Gordon, Huber and
4More loosely related is recent work on what opposition parties gain from engaging in the tactics of delay
and obstruction (Patty 2016, Fong and Krehbiel 2018). However, in these models the opposition party does
not actually affect the ultimate implementation of policy, only the timing of implementation. In addition,
how we model the relationship between incumbents and policy implementers is some ways the inverse of the
model of accountability developed in Li (2018). In that model, a political appointee is of high or low type
who produces outputs that correlate with his underlying type, which is unobservable to the politician who
appointed him. The politician decides whether to retain the appointee, conditional on his output, whereas
in our model the politician (incumbent) has no say over who the implementer is.
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Landa 2007). In contrast, Shotts and Ashworth (2015) develop a model in which challengers
can make statements to voters about which of two policies is “correct” (in the sense of match-
ing the true state of the world)—in some equilibria, these statements can affect whether the
incumbent is retained or not (see also Lemon 2005, Warren 2012). Our model follows most
of the literature in assuming a passive challenger. However, in some instances the saboteur
works “in concert” with the challenger in the hopes of defeating the incumbent—our theory
can thus be placed in a broader class of models where actors take affirmative steps to try to
bolster the chance of challenger victory.
In terms of its assumptions about what politicians and voters care about with respect
to the production of public policy, our theory also builds on the burgeoning literature on
valence models of legislative output (Hirsch and Shotts 2015a; 2012; 2015b, Ting 2009, Hitt,
Volden and Wiseman 2017).5 These models typically assume that all players value valence
regardless of how far away a policy is ideologically from them. Our model also makes this
assumption; however, the fact that valence can influence the voter’s decision to retain the
incumbent creates a dynamic incentive for sabotage, because the saboteur values replacing
the incumbent policy even more than its success. Thus, by integrating a principal-agent
model that incorporates concerns over policy outcomes with a theory of democratic selection,
we allow for sabotage to be rational (in some equilibria) even it though it carries the cost of
reduced valence.
Finally, our model is related to burgeoning empirical literature on “blame attribution,”
which evaluates how citizens appropriate blame across policy-makers in the wake of policy
failures (Healy and Malhotra 2013, 291-3). Much of this research focuses on how partisan
cues may bias citizen evaluation of the actions of elected officials, particularly when blame
may be plausibly distributed across multiple parties (as occurs frequently in a system of
federalism) (see e.g. Arceneaux 2005; 2006, Malhotra and Kuo 2008, Tilley and Hobolt 2011,
Healy, Kuo and Malhotra 2014). While there are no parties as such in our model, as we noted
5Lax and Cameron (2007) consider the role of valence in judicial opinions.
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one interpretation of the saboteur is that of the out-party who can block implementation.
Our model illustrates that the effect of, and incentives to, engage in sabotage are rich and
multifaceted even when voters have no difficulty attributing blame for policy failures.
2 The Model
We model a game played by two policy-motivated actors; a decisionmaker V , interpreted
as a voter, and a saboteur S, interpreted as an unelected actor in government who can
influence policy-implementation by elected incumbents. It is more accurate to think of S as
a potential saboteur since he has the option to not engage in sabotage, but in our general
discussion we will use the term “saboteur” as shorthand.
At the start of the game there is an incumbent politician and a challenger, each of whom
are associated with a respective policy (which, in turn, the saboteur will chose whether to
implement). Denote these policies j ∈ J = {I, C}, where I denotes the policy associated
with the incumbent (i.e. the “incumbent” policy in place at the start of the game), and C
denotes the policy associated with the challenger (i.e. the “challenger” policy).
Each policy consists of a spatial ideology xj ∈ [−∞,∞]; we assume without loss of
generality that xI > xC . In addition, the incumbent and the challenger may be either of
“low” or “high” quality, as denoted by λj ∈ {L,H}—this type affects the likelihood that
a “successful” outcome can be achieved with their respective policies.6 The incumbent and
challenger are exogenous and not players in the game; they are intended to represent elected
politicians who passively implement their own ideal points and achieve successes based on
their underlying ability. For simplicity, we abstract away from strategic policy decisions by
politicians.
The decision maker and the saboteur each have an ideal ideology xi and suffer spatial
loss from the distance of the policy’s position to their own ideal. However, the players also
have a shared preference for successful outcomes. Specifically, the policy jt of the incumbent
6For linguistic flexibility, we will interchangeably refer to “incumbents” and “incumbent policies,” as well
as “challengers” and “challenger policies.” Similarly, we sometimes refer to polices as either of low or high
quality; this simply means the policies of low- or high-quality politicians, respectively.
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in period t must be implemented by the saboteur with “effort” et ∈ {0, 1}. Although we use
the terminology of effort to preserve comparability with standard principal-agent models, a
key assumption in our model is that effort is actually free. Effort is thus better interpreted
as the absence of active interference by the saboteur with policy implementation—that is,
“high effort” means to let the policy to run its natural course, while “low effort” means to
actively interfere with its success via sabotage.
Once the saboteur chooses his effort, the policy may succeed or fail to achieve a good
outcome or success (yt ∈ {0, 1}). Player i places a value γi > 0 on success, so both players
value successes. A policy jt chosen in period t and implemented with effort et succeeds
with probability et · qλjt , where 0 < qL < qH < 1 is the probability each type of policy
succeeds with effort. Thus, high effort allows the policy to succeed with a probability based
on its underlying type, while low effort (sabotage) ensures failure. Finally, policy j ∈ {I, C}
is “high” with prior probability θj ∈ [0, 1] (the types of the incumbent and challenger are
uncorrelated, and may have different prior probabilities of being high quality).
Players’ utility over the two periods is the discounted sum based on the ideology of the
selected policies and their outcomes, i.e.
2∑
t=1
δt−1 · (− (xi − xjt)2 + γi · yt) ,
where xjt denotes the ideological location of the policy chosen in period t and y
t denotes the
outcome in period t. Table 1 summarizes the model’s notation.
Sequence of play The game proceeds as follows.
1. Nature selects the incumbent’s type. Depending on the model variant considered the
type is either revealed to the saboteur or not.
2. The saboteur chooses effort e1 ∈ {0, 1} on the incumbent policy j1 = I; this choice of
effort is observable to the voter/decisionmaker.
3. A first period outcome (y1 ∈ {0, 1}) is realized.
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Parameter Description
V Voter
S (Potential) Saboteur
j ∈ J = {I, C} Policies associated with Incumbent and Challenger
xj ∈ [−∞,∞] Spatial ideology of policy
t ∈ 1, 2 Period
λj ∈ {L,H} Low quality or high quality policy
et {0, 1} “Effort” of saboteur
yt ∈ {0, 1} Failure or Success of Policy
γi > 0 Value of success to player i (Valence)
et · qλjt Probability of success (0 < qL < qH < 1)
θj ∈ [0, 1] Prior probability policy j ∈ {I, C} is “high”
U (xi;xI , xC) Net policy benefit
V
(
θˆI , θˆC ; γi, q
)
Net valence benefit
∆λi (pi
y
e ) Impact probability for type λI
Table 1: Table of notation
4. The voter observes the first period outcome and decides to retain the incumbent and
his associated policy (j2 = I) or switch to the challenger and her associated policy
(j2 = C).
5. Stages 1-3 repeat.
All players observe the realization of yt and whether the saboteur exerted effort; the voter’s
decision in the first period is thus based on these variables.
3 Preliminary Equilibrium Characterization
We begin by characterizing the second period.
3.1 Second Period
In the second period there is no impending policy change. The saboteur will thus always
strictly prefer to exert high effort on the policy (e2 = 1) since effort is free, the policy will
succeed with probability qλjt > 0, and he values valence. Thus, from the perspective of an
arbitrary player i with ideal point xi and interim beliefs θˆj about policy j’s type at the end
of the first period (beliefs that are computed from equilibrium), the expected future payoff
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from choosing policy j ∈ {I, C} for the second period is:
γi
(
qL + θˆj (qH − qL)
)
− (xi − xj)2 .
Consequently, the second period net benefit of retaining the incumbent I rather switching
to the challenger C consists of both a net valence benefit and a net policy benefit as follows:
(xi − xC)2 − (xi − xI)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
net policy benefit
+ γi
(
θˆI − θˆC
)
(qH − qL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net valence benefit
We denote the net policy benefit as U (xi;xI , xC). It is increasing in the ideological alignment
of player i with the incumbent policy, and is positive iff xi >
xI+xC
2
(recall we have assumed
xI > xC). We denote the net valence benefit as V
(
θˆI , θˆC ; γi, q
)
—this is increasing in player
i’s valuation of valence i, and in the difference in her interim beliefs θˆI− θˆC about the quality
of the incumbent. It is negative if the challenger policy is believed to be higher quality than
the incumbent policy. It is also increasing in the difference qH − qL, the probability a high
versus low quality policy succeeds absent sabotage.
3.2 First Period
We now characterize equilibrium play in the first period. The form of the strategies for
the two players is as follows:
• Voter: The voter’s strategy is a probability of retaining the incumbent piye ∈ [0, 1] as
a function of the saboteur’s effort level e and the observed outcome y.
• Saboteur: The saboteur’s strategy is a probability of exerting high effort eλI ∈ [0, 1]
as a function of the incumbent policy’s type λI . (In the model variant where the
saboteur is uninformed about the incumbent’s type, clearly eL = eH).
We walk through the calculus of each player in turn.
3.2.1 The Voter’s Calculus
When the voter makes her retention decision she has has already formed interim beliefs
θˆe,yI about the type of the incumbent policy based on both the saboteur’s observed effort
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decision e and the observed outcome y (if the saboteur did not engage in sabotage). (The
voter’s beliefs about the challenger policy remain at the prior θC since the saboteur is assumed
to be uninformed about the quality of policymakers that are not in office). The voter then
decides whether or not to retain the incumbent based on these beliefs. We examine the
retention decision and the formation of beliefs in turn.
Retention Decision Given the voter’s interim beliefs θˆI about the incumbent policy’s
type, her net benefit from retaining the incumbent is:
γV
(
θˆe,yI − θC
)
(qH − qL) + U (xV ;xI , xC)
She will thus choose to retain the incumbent i.f.f. :
θˆe,yI ≥ θC −
U (xV ;xI , xC)
γV (qH − qL) = θ¯C (xV , xI , xC ; γV , qH , qL) ,
where θ¯C (·) denotes the voter’s belief threshold for retention. To isolate attention to conflict
between the saboteur and the voter, we henceforth restrict attention to the region of the
parameter space where the voter prefers to retain an incumbent known to be good, but
replace an incumbent known to be bad—that is, where θ¯C (·) ∈ (0, 1).
Belief Formation The voter updates her beliefs based on two observables: the saboteur’s
effort e and the valence outcome y. Her updating also depends on her beliefs about saboteur’s
strategy (eL, eH) (which are correct in equilibrium).
Let θ˜e,yI (eL, eH) denote the voter’s updated belief (via Bayes’ rule) about the incumbent’s
type as a function of observed effort e and the valence outcome y, as well as beliefs (eL, eH)
about the probability the saboteur will exert effort given each type of incumbent.
First consider the saboteur exerting effort (e = 1), so both success and failure are possible.
After a success, the voter’s interim belief is:
θ˜1,1I (·) = Pr (λI = H|e = 1, y = 1) =
Pr (λI = H, e1 = 1, y = 1)
Pr (e = 1, y = 1)
=
θIeHqH
θIeHqH + (1− θI) eLqL (1)
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After failure, the voter’s interim belief is:
θ˜1,0I (·) = Pr (λI = H|e = 1, y = 0) =
Pr (λI = H, e = 1, y = 0)
Pr (e = 1, y = 0)
=
θIeH (1− qH)
θIeH (1− qH) + (1− θI) eL (1− qL) (2)
It is straightforward that success causes the voter to revise her beliefs upward from what
they would be after observing effort alone, while failure causes her to update downward; thus
θ˜1,1I (·) > θ˜1,0I (·) unless the saboteur’s decision to exert effort has already perfectly signalled
that the policy is high quality (eL = 0 and eH > 0) or low quality (eL > 0 and eH = 0).
Last, consider if the saboteur exerts no effort e = 0 (i.e. “sabotage”) after which failure
is assured. After that failure, the voter’s interim belief is:
θ˜0,0I (·) =
Pr (λI = H, e = 0)
Pr (e = 0)
=
θI (1− eH)
θI (1− eH) + (1− θI) (1− eL) (3)
3.2.2 The Saboteur’s Calculus
The saboteur’s willingness to exert effort depends on three factors: (1) the effect of effort
on his contemporaneous valence utility, (2) the net future benefit of retaining the incumbent,
and (3) the effect of effort on the likelihood the incumbent is re-elected.
Effect of effort on first-period valence Exerting effort results in success with prob-
ability qλI , so the net valence benefit of exerting effort is qλIγS.
Net benefit of retaining incumbent The saboteur’s expected net benefit from get-
ting the incumbent re-elected is U (xS;xI , xC) + V (1λI=H , θC ; γS, q) since he is privately
informed about the incumbent’s type λI .
Effect of effort on retention probabilities The saboteur knows the incumbent’s
type λI ∈ {0, 1} and has beliefs (that are correct in equilibrium) about the probability the
voter will retain the incumbent piye down each path of play. He can thus calculate how much
exerting effort will affect the probability that the voter retains the incumbent, which crucially
influences his willingness to sabotage the policy. Because the probability of success depends
on the incumbent policy’s type λI , so too does the impact of effort on the probability of
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retention. We henceforth call this quantity the impact probability for type λI , and denote it
as ∆λi (pi
y
e ).
Should the saboteur exert low effort (e = 0), failure will result for sure and the retention
probability is just pi0. If he instead exerts high effort (e = 1), the incumbent policy will
succeed with probability qλI and be retained with probability pi
1
1, and fail with probability
1− qλI and be retained with probability pi01. The impact probability for an incumbent policy
of type λI is thus:
∆λi (pi
y
e ) =
(
qλI · pi11 + (1− qλI ) · pi01
)− pi00
=
(
pi01 − pi00
)
+ qλI
(
pi11 − pi01
)
Total net benefit Combining the preceding observations, the net benefit to the sabo-
teur of exerting effort is:
qλIγS + δ∆λi (·) (V (1λI=H , θC ; γS, q) + U (xS;xI , xC)) .
Exerting effort to implement an incumbent policy of type λi is a best response i.f.f. this is
≥ 0, and sabotage is a best response i.f.f. this is ≤ 0.
To simplify the analysis we henceforth assume that the policy conflict between the sabo-
teur and the voter is sufficiently strong that he would strictly prefer to sabotage even a high
quality incumbent (λi = H) if sabotage would induce the voter to replace the incumbent for
sure when she would otherwise retain it for sure (that is, when ∆H = 1).
Assumption 1 We henceforth assume that
qHγS + δ (V (1λI=H , θC ; γS, q) + U (xS;xI , xC)) < 0
⇐⇒ −U (xS;xI , xC)
γS
>
qH
δ
+ (qH − qL) (1− θC)
In words, our assumption is that the ratio of the saboteur’s spatial preference for the chal-
lenger, U (xS;xI , xC) > 0 to her valuation of quality γS is sufficiently high. With this
assumption, there is a unique strictly interior impact probability ∆¯λi (·) ∈ (0, 1) for each
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incumbent type defined by:
∆¯λI (·) =
qλI
δ
(
−U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
− (qH − qL) (1λI=H − θC)
) (4)
that would make the saboteur willing to sabotage each type of incumbent policy. Be-
cause qH > 0 (high quality policies generate more valence “today”) and V (1, θC ; γS, q) >
V (0, θC ; γS, q) (high quality policies generate more valence “tomorrow”), it is straightfor-
ward to see that ∆¯H (·) > ∆¯L (·). That is, the impact of effort on the probability of retention
must be higher to induce sabotage of a high quality policy than a low quality one, because
the saboteur also values valence, and high quality policies are more likely to generate it.
3.3 Equilibrium Statement
We now state conditions for a PBE (in the subsequent analysis we apply additional
refinements that restrict off-path beliefs and shrink the set of equilibria).
Proposition 1 The following conditions are necessary and sufficient for a PBE.
• (Saboteur) For all λI ∈ {L,H}, eλI = 1 (0) ⇐⇒ ∆λi (piye ) < (>) ∆¯λI (·)
• (Voter) For all (e, y) ∈ {0, 1}2, the voter’s equilibrium interim beliefs θˆe,yI are equal
to θ˜e,yI (eL, eH) characterized in eqns 1-3 when (e, y) is on equilibrium path, and
piye = 1 (0) ⇐⇒ θˆe,yI (eL, eH) > (<) θ¯C (·) .
4 Results
The saboteur’s incentive to sabotage the incumbent, and thus the pattern of equilibria,
depends crucially on the policy’s initial popularity with the voter. This popularity determines
what outcomes will induce the voter to replace the policy, and thus the saboteur’s incentives
to manipulate the voter’s beliefs via sabotage. Recall from the definition that θ˜1,yI (1, 1)
denotes the voter’s interim beliefs about the incumbent after observing effort and an outcome
y ∈ {0, 1} if she believed the saboteur to be pooling on effort (eL = 1, eH = 1). With these
beliefs, the absence of sabotage alone is uninformative about the policy’s quality, and the
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voter updates solely on success and failure. Due to the importance of these beliefs for
categorizing equilibria, we henceforth denote them as θ˜yI for simplicity; applying equations
1-3 we have that
θ˜yI =

θIqH
θIqH+(1−θI)qL if y = 1 (success)
θI(1−qH)
θI(1−qH)+(1−θI)(1−qL) if y = 0 (failure)
Clearly 0 < θ˜0I < θI < θ˜
1
I < 1 (failure and success are imperfect “bad news” and “good
news” about the incumbent’s quality, respectively). Using these beliefs we now divide the
incumbent’s initial popularity into four categories for the purposes of equilibrium analysis.
Definition 1 The incumbent is said to be
(VU) Very unpopular i.f.f. θ˜0I < θI < θ˜
1
I ≤ θ¯C (·)
(SU) Somewhat unpopular i.f.f. θ˜0I < θI ≤ θ¯C (·) < θ˜1I
(SP) Somewhat popular i.f.f. θ˜0I < θ¯C (·) ≤ θI < θ˜1I
(VP) Very popular i.f.f. θ¯C (·) ≤ θ˜0I < θI < θ˜1I
A popular incumbent is one that would be retained in the absence of new information (either
from the saboteur’s observed decisions, or from success and failure), while an unpopular
incumbent is one that would be replaced. The distinction between a “very” and “somewhat”
popular or unpopular incumbent is based on what the voter would do after observing success
or failure (but inferring nothing from the absence of sabotage alone); she would follow her
prior for a “very” popular or “very” unpopular policy regardless of the outcome, but base her
retention decisions on observed success or failure for a “somewhat” popular or “somewhat”
unpopular policy. Figure 1 provides a visual summary of the definition of popularity.
4.1 An uninformed saboteur
Although our main model assumes that the saboteur is privately informed about the
quality of the incumbent, to clarify incentives it is helpful to first consider the baseline case
in which he is no better informed than the voter. In this case, the voter infers nothing directly
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Very popular Somewhat popular Somewhat unpopular Very unpopular
Underlying popularity of incumbent (high to low)
Retained in absence of any new information
(either from bureucrat's observed decision
or policy success)
Not retained in absence of any new information
(either from bureucrat's observed decision
or policy success)
Retained even if
policy failure
Retained unless
policy failure
Replaced only if
policy failure
Replaced even if
policy success
Figure 1: The popularity of the incumbent and its relationship to retention. See text for
details.
from the saboteur’s decision; she thus follows her prior θI if the saboteur sabotages since
sabotage suppresses the revelation of additional information about quality via outcomes, and
her Bayes’ updated beliefs θ˜yI after success and failure otherwise. Equilibria are as follows.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the saboteur is uninformed about the incumbent’s quality.
• The voter’s strategies are as follows:
– She replaces after sabotage (pi0 = 0) if the incumbent policy was initially unpopu-
lar, and retains (pi0 = 1) if it was not.
– Absent sabotage, she bases retention on success and failure i.f.f. the incumbent was
somewhat (un)popular (pi11 = 1 > pi
0
1 = 0), and bases retention on the incumbent’s
initial popularity otherwise.
• The saboteur’s strategies are as follows:
– If the incumbent is either popular or very unpopular, he exerts effort.
– If the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, he sabotages i.f.f.
−U (xS;xI , xC)
γS
≥ 1
δ
+ (qH − qL) ·
(
θ˜1I − θC
)
The calculus of sabotage for an uninformed saboteur is straightforward. He can allow
the policy to proceed naturally, generate valence with a probability associated with the
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underlying quality of the incumbent (which is unknown), and thereby potentially reveal
information suggesting that the quality is high. Or, he can sabotage, which suppresses
the revelation of more information about incumbent quality, but also destroys valence in
expectation.
When the incumbent is popular there is thus no benefit to sabotage; it simply prevents
the voter from learning via failure that she may wish to replace an incumbent that she would
otherwise retain. There is also no benefit to sabotage if the incumbent is very unpopular—
the voter will replace it regardless, so sabotage just destroys quality with no electoral benefit.
It is only when the incumbent somewhat unpopular that there is a rationale for sabotage—
it deprives the voter of the opportunity to learn via success that they prefer to retain an
incumbent that they would have otherwise replaced. In this case, it is worthwhile for an
uninformed saboteur to engage in sabotage if his relative valuation of the challenger’s policy
compared to valence is sufficiently high.
4.2 An informed saboteur
When the saboteur is privately informed about the quality of the incumbent policy, the
effect of a decision to sabotage on the voter’s beliefs is much more complicated. Sabotage
suppresses the revelation of information about the policy via outcomes. However, since the
voter understands that the decision to sabotage is strategic, sabotage may itself signal that
the incumbent is high quality, if sabotage represents the saboteur’s attempt to conceal this
fact. But if the voter infers from sabotage that the policy is actually high quality and
should be retained, then the saboteur will not engage in it, knowing that it will have the
opposite of the intended electoral effect, and also eliminate valuable policy quality. How
these complicated inferences play out in equilibrium is not obvious.
The core complexity of the model with an informed saboteur is that the saboteur does
not have an unambiguously greater incentive to sabotage one type of incumbent or the
other. Instead, there are two competing forces at play—which force dominates, which type
of incumbent the saboteur is more willing to sabotage, and thus what sabotage signals to
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the voter depends on the incumbent’s initial popularity. When the incumbent is somewhat
(un)popular, there are actually multiple equilibria in which the voter draws opposite infer-
ences from sabotage, underlying the complexity in determining exactly what a rational voter
should infer from policy sabotage.
The first force is the saboteur’s intrinsic value on valence. Since a high quality incumbent
is more likely to generate valence than a low quality one, more valence is lost as a result
of sabotaging a high quality incumbent. This force pushes in the direction of a greater
willingness to sabotage low quality incumbents. In the preceding analysis this property is
manifested in ∆¯H (·) > ∆¯L (·); that is, a higher electoral impact of sabotage is necessary to
induce sabotage of a high quality incumbent versus a low quality one.
The second force is the greater electoral competitiveness of high quality incumbents. If
allowed to freely implement their policies, high quality incumbents are more likely to succeed
by virtue of their greater ability. If the voter is using success and failure to decide whether
to retain the incumbent, then high quality incumbents are therefore also more likely to be
retained if not sabotaged. This force pushes in the direction of a greater willingness to
sabotage high quality incumbents, as the saboteur hopes to keep the voter from learning
this fact.
Due to these competing forces, there is no separating equilibrium under Assumption 1.
If sabotage perfectly signals that the incumbent is high quality while effort signals she is low
quality, then sabotage will accomplish nothing electorally and just destroy policy quality.
Conversely, if sabotage perfectly signals that the incumbent is low quality while effort signals
that she is high quality, then sabotage will be too effectively electorally, and the saboteur
will always engage in it regardless of the incumbent’s actual quality.
We now characterize how these competing forces play out to determine equilibria under
the four distinct popularity conditions.
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4.2.1 A Very Popular Incumbent
As previously described, an uninformed saboteur never sabotages a very popular incum-
bent, because nothing can be accomplished from doing so—absent the revelation of additional
information via outcomes, the voter will simply retain them. For the same reason, it cannot
be an equilibrium for an informed saboteur to always (that is, regardless of the incumbent’s
type) sabotage a very popular incumbent—the voter will neither observe outcomes nor infer
anything from sabotage, and will thus retain the incumbent for sure.
The logic breaks down, however, when considering whether it is an equilibrium for the
informed saboteur to never sabotage a very popular incumbent. When the voter knows that
the saboteur is privately informed about the incumbent’s quality, the unexpected presence
of sabotage itself contains information about that quality. The effectiveness and equilibrium
incidence of sabotage thus hinges on a simple question—what should the voter infer about
the incumbent’s quality in the face of unexpected sabotage?
For a very popular incumbent, the answer is simple: she should infer that the incumbent
is low quality and replace her. Somewhat counterintuitively, the reason is that the saboteur
intrinsically values quality. If the incumbent is so popular ex ante that they will be retained
even after policy failure, then there is no greater electoral incentive to sabotage a high quality
incumbent than a low quality one—the former will succeed with a higher probability than
the latter, but both will be retained regardless. Since it is intrinsically costlier to sabotage a
high quality incumbent than a low quality one (as more valence will be lost) the voter should
infer that an incumbent who is unexpectedly sabotaged is definitely low quality. But should
she make this inference, sabotage will indeed harm the incumbent’s reputation enough to
induce the voter to replace, and the saboteur will always want to sabotage the incumbent.
This logic implies that in equilibrium, some sabotage must occur.
It turns out that there is a unique equilibrium satisfying the refinement D1; it is partially
separating and takes the following form. First, sabotage must sometimes occur and harm
the incumbent’s electoral prospects, and so must credibly communicate some negative infor-
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mation about the incumbent’s quality. However, it cannot perfectly communicate that the
incumbent is low quality; if it did, then sabotage would cause the incumbent to be replaced
for sure, and the saboteur would always want to sabotage regardless of the incumbent’s type.
Thus, the saboteur must always sabotage a low quality incumbent (eL = 0), and sometimes
sabotages a high quality one (eH > 0). With this strategy, the absence of sabotage perfectly
reveals that the incumbent is high quality and ensures the incumbent’s reelection regardless
of whether she succeeds or fails. The presence of sabotage, in contrast, credibly but im-
perfectly reveals that the incumbent is low quality, triggering replacement with an interior
probability. Formally, the equilibrium is as follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the saboteur is informed, and the incumbent is very popular.
Then there is a unique equilibrium satisfying refinement (D1) that takes the following form.
• The saboteur always sabotages a low quality incumbent (eL = 0), and exerts effort for
a high quality incumbent with probability:
eH =
θI − θ¯C (·)
θI
(
1− θ¯C (·)
) where θ¯C (·) = θC − U (xV ;xI , xC)
γV (qH − qL)
• The voter always retains the incumbent absent sabotage regardless of the outcome (pi01 =
pi11 = 1), and retains after sabotage with an interior probability equal to
pi00 = 1− ∆¯H (·) = 1−
qH
δ
(
−U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
− (qH − qL) (1− θC)
)
The unique equilibrium when the incumbent is very popular thus exhibits a great deal of
sabotage that would not occur if the saboteur were ignorant of the incumbent’s quality.
We now analyze comparative statics. We first consider the saboteur’s probability of
sabotaging.
Corollary 1 When the incumbent is very popular, the saboteur always sabotages a low qual-
ity incumbent. The probability he sabotages a high quality incumbent is:
• increasing in the challenger’s reputation, θC, and in the importance to the voter γV (qH − qL)
of having a high quality incumbent.
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• decreasing in the voter’s spatial preference for the incumbent U (xV ;xI , xC) and the
incumbent’s reputation θI
When the incumbent is very popular, the key determinant of the likelihood of sabotage is the
need to keep the voter indifferent to retaining the incumbent in the face of sabotage. If the
voter’s propensity to retain the incumbent after sabotage increases ceteris paribus (higher
U (xV ;xI , xC) or θI) sabotage must become a more credible signal that the incumbent is low
quality, and thus the saboteur must sabotage a high quality incumbent less. Conversely,
if the voter’s propensity to reelect the incumbent after sabotage decreases ceteris paribus
(higher θC or γV (qH − qL)) sabotage must become a less credible signal that the incumbent
is low quality, and thus the saboteur must sabotage a high quality incumbent more.
We last examine the voter’s likelihood of retaining a sabotaged incumbent.
Corollary 2 When the incumbent is very popular, the voter’s probability of retaining the
incumbent after sabotage is:
• increasing in the saboteur’s relative value −U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
for the challenger policy, his
weight on the future δ, the challenger’s reputation θC, and the likelihood qL that a low
quality incumbent produces quality
• decreasing in the likelihood qH that a high quality incumbent produces quality
When the incumbent is very popular, what determines the likelihood that the incumbent
is retained after sabotage is the need to keep the saboteur indifferent to sabotaging a high
quality incumbent. The higher is the likelihood that the incumbent is still retained despite
sabotage, the lower is the saboteur’s incentive to engage in it. Thus, if the saboteur’s elec-
toral incentive to sabotage a high quality incumbent goes up (due to a greater spatial value
for the challenger −US (·), a greater weight on the future δ, a higher quality challenger θC ,
or a decreased importance of selecting high quality politicians qL) the voter’s likelihood of
retaining the incumbent post-sabotage must increase to diminish his incentive to sabotage.
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Conversely, if the saboteur becomes less willing to sabotage because the importance of se-
lecting high quality incumbents increases (higher qH or γS), the likelihood of retaining the
incumbent post-sabotage must decrease to make sabotage more electorally effective.
4.2.2 A Very Unpopular Incumbent
Recall that that an uninformed saboteur never sabotages a very unpopular incumbent—
when the incumbent is already very unpopular, the saboteur will get her desired electoral
outcome of replacement regardless of whether or not she sabotages. For the same reason,
when the saboteur is informed it remains an equilibrium to never sabotage (that is, regardless
of the incumbent’s type); since the incumbent already has no electoral prospects, sabotage
cannot make them any worse.
When the saboteur is informed, there are also two additional equilibria that satisfy D1—
one in which the saboteur sometimes sabotages a low quality incumbent, and one in which
he always sabotages both types of incumbents. However, because both of these equilibria
are Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium in which the saboteur never sabotages, we omit
consideration of them from the main text. We now summarize these results.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the saboteur is informed, and the incumbent is very unpopular.
If the saboteur’s relative value for the challenger policy −U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
is larger than 1
δ
+ qH ,
then there is a unique Pareto-dominant equilibrium among those satisfying refinement (D1)
in which the saboteur never sabotages and the incumbent is always replaced.7
The most plausible equilibrium with a very unpopular incumbent and an informed saboteur
is thus identical to the unique equilibrium with an uninformed saboteur—the saboteur never
sabotages because doing is both costly and unnecessary to achieve her desired electoral
outcome.
7The stated bound is sufficient but not necessary—the condition that is both necessary and sufficient is
qualitatively similar but significantly messier.
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4.2.3 A Somewhat Popular Incumbent
As with a very popular incumbent, it cannot be an equilibrium for an informed saboteur
to always sabotage a somewhat popular incumbent, since doing so will only lead to retention.
Whether there is an equilibrium in which the saboteur never sabotages such an incumbent
once again hinges on what the voter should infer about the incumbent’s quality in the face
of unexpected sabotage. The inference she draws when a somewhat popular incumbent is
unexpectedly sabotaged, however, is actually quite different than the inference she draws
when a very popular incumbent is unexpectedly sabotaged. When the incumbent is only
somewhat popular, the voter is actually using success and failure to decide whether to
retain her. Since a high quality incumbent is more likely succeed than a low quality one,
the saboteur may actually have a greater electoral incentive to sabotage a high quality
incumbent. But if this is the case and the voter understands it, then sabotage will actually
improve the incumbent’s reputation and electoral prospects, and the saboteur will avoid it.
It turns out that this logic indeed obtains, and thus the absence of sabotage is an equi-
librium, when the saboteur’s relative value for the challenger policy is sufficiently high. As
in the preceding case, there are also two additional equilibria satisfying D1—–one in which
the saboteur always sabotages a low quality incumbent and sometimes sabotages a high
quality one, and another in which he sometimes sabotages both types of incumbents, but is
more likely to sabotage a high quality one. However, because both of these equilibria are
Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium in which the saboteur never sabotages, we again omit
consideration of them from the main text. We now summarize the result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the saboteur is informed and the incumbent is somewhat popu-
lar. If the saboteur’s relative value for the challenger policy −U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
is larger than 1
δ
+qH ,
then then there is a unique Pareto-dominant equilibrium among those satisfying refinement
(D1) in which the saboteur never sabotages.
Thus, when the incumbent is somewhat popular and the saboteur is sufficiently motivated
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to replace the incumbent, the most plausible equilibrium with an informed saboteur is again
identical to the equilibrium with an uninformed one—the saboteur never sabotages. The
logic for the equilibrium, however, is quite different. When the saboteur is informed, it is
precisely because the voter understands the saboteur’s greater strategic incentive to sabotage
a high quality incumbent than low quality one that sabotage is ineffective for harming the
incumbent’s electoral prospects. Understanding this, the saboteur thus avoids sabotage in
equilibrium.
4.2.4 A Somewhat Unpopular Incumbent
The most complex case—-and arguably most interesting—is that of the somewhat un-
popular incumbent. Such an incumbent will be replaced unless a policy success occurs that
improves her reputation (and provided that the absence of sabotage does not itself harm the
incumbent’s reputation too much).
When the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, there are actually three distinct equilibria
satisfying the (D1) refinement. In addition, there is no Pareto ordering among them, and
therefore no obvious criteria for selecting or discarding any of them. While this hinders
extracting testable comparative statics from the model, it clearly illustrates the complexity of
determining exactly what a rational voter should infer from policy sabotage by an informed,
strategic actor.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the saboteur is informed and the incumbent is somewhat un-
popular. If the saboteur’s relative value for the challenger policy −U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
is larger than
1
δ
+ qH , then there are three equilibria satisfying the refinement (D1).
• (Always Exert Effort) The saboteur never sabotages, and the voter retains if and only
if the incumbent succeeds. Should the voter unexpectedly see sabotage, she retains the
incumbent
• (Always Sabotage) The saboteur always sabotages, and the voter always replaces the
incumbent. Should the voter unexpectedly see effort, she retains the incumbent.
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• (Always Mix) The saboteur sabotages both high and low quality incumbents with posi-
tive probability. The voter sometimes retains incumbents who are sabotaged, and also
incumbents who are not sabotaged and succeed. She always replaces incumbents who
are not sabotaged and fail.
– The voter’s probability of exerting effort for each incumbent type is
0 < eH =
(
qL
qH − qL
)(
θ¯C (·)− θI
θI
(
1− θ¯C (·)
)) < eL = ( qH
qH − qL
)(
θ¯C (·)− θI
θ¯C (·) (1− θI)
)
< 1
– The saboteur’s retention probabilities are
pi01 = 0 < pi
0
0 =
qL∆¯H (·)− qH∆¯L (·)
qH − qL < pi
1
1 =
∆¯H (·)− ∆¯L (·)
qH − qL < 1
Pooling on effort is best for the voter and worst for the saboteur. Pooling on sabotage is best
for the saboteur and worst for the voter. Mixing is intermediate for both players.
In the first equilibrium, the saboteur always sabotages the incumbent in order to suppress
the revelation of information about her quality, and incumbent is always replaced. Similar
to the case of a very popular incumbent, sabotage in this equilibrium is perversely sustained
by the saboteur’s intrinsic preference for quality. The voter’s on-path behavior gives the
saboteur a greater incentive to sabotage a low quality incumbent than a high quality one.
Thus, if the saboteur were to unexpectedly decline to sabotage, the voter would infer that
the incumbent is high quality and retain her. The saboteur’s fear that the voter will infer
this prevents it. The equilibrium is the best among the three for the saboteur, and the worst
among the three for the voter.
In the second equilibrium, the saboteur never sabotages the incumbent. This is an
equilibrium for identical reasons as in the somewhat popular case. The voter’s on path
behavior—reelect the incumbent if and only if she succeeds—gives the saboteur a greater
incentive to sabotage a high quality incumbent than a low quality one, since they are more
likely to succeed. Thus, if the saboteur were to unexpectedly sabotage, the voter would infer
that the incumbent is high quality and retain her. The saboteur’s fear that the voter will
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infer this prevents sabotage. This equilibrium is the worst among the three for the saboteur,
and the best among the three for the voter.
In the final equilibrium, the saboteur sometimes sabotages both high and low quality
incumbents, but is more likely to sabotage the former. Sabotage thus perversely improves
the incumbent’s reputation relative to the prior, leading the voter to sometimes retain them.
Conversely, the absence of sabotage harms the incumbent’s reputation, but not so much
that a policy success can’t overcome that harm. An incumbent who is not sabotaged and
succeeds is retained with a higher probability than an incumbent who is sabotaged, but an
incumbent who fails is always replaced.
In the third equilibrium, both forces that potentially influence the saboteur’s incentive
to sabotage each type of incumbent are operative. The saboteur’s value for quality makes
sabotaging a high quality incumbent more costly. Simultaneously, the voter’s use of out-
comes in her retention decisions makes sabotaging a high quality incumbent more electorally
damaging. In equilibrium, these forces exactly balance each other out, leading the saboteur
to sometimes sabotage both incumbent types. This equilibrium yields welfare in between the
other two for both players.
We conclude by considering comparative statics in the mixing equilibrium (equilibrium
behavior is invariant to the underlying model parameters in the two pooling equilibria). We
first consider the saboteur’s probability of sabotaging.
Corollary 3 When the incumbent is moderately unpopular, the probability 1 − eλI that the
saboteur sabotages each type of incumbent λI is:
• decreasing in the challenger’s reputation, θC, and in the voter’s weight on quality γV
• increasing in the voter’s spatial preference for the incumbent U (xV ;xI , xC) and the
incumbent’s reputation θI
When the incumbent is moderately unpopular, the key determinant of the likelihood that
each type of incumbent is sabotaged is the need to keep the voter indifferent to retaining the
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incumbent in the face of both sabotage and policy success. If the voter becomes more inclined
ex ante to replace the incumbent ceteris paribus (higher θC or γV , lower U (xV ;xI , xC) or
θI), then sabotage must become a more credible signal that the incumbent is high quality
(since based on the prior the voter would want to replace), and simultaneously effort must
become a less credible signal that the incumbent is low quality (since based on the prior and
a policy success the voter would want to retain). This may only be accomplished by having
the probability of sabotage decrease for both types.
We last examine the voter’s likelihood of retaining an incumbent who is either sabotaged
or who succeeds.
Corollary 4 When the incumbent is moderately unpopular, the voter’s probability of retain-
ing the incumbent after both sabotage and success is decreasing in the saboteur’s relative
value −U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
for the challenger policy, his weight on the future δ, and the challenger’s
reputation θC
Thus, both retention probabilities decrease as the bureaucrat’s desire to replace the incum-
bent becomes stronger.
Overall, the most interesting feature of the equilibrium analysis for a somewhat unpopular
incumbent is that it is possible for a rational voter to understand the saboteur’s greater
incentive to sabotage a high quality incumbent, respond to it by sometimes reelecting such an
incumbent, and yet for the saboteur to nevertheless sometimes pursue sabotage. Moreover,
it is precisely incumbents who are initially weak, but who could reveal themselves to be
worth retaining through policy success, who elicit this behavior from the saboteur.
4.3 Summarizing results
It is useful to step back and compare the equilibrium results both across the versions of
the model with an uninformed and informed saboteur, and across the popularity regions.
Figure 2 depicts the probability of the saboteur engaging in sabotage as a function of
the probability θC that the challenger is of high quality—varying this parameter over the
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range [0, 1] generates the four popularity regions. The top panel shows the results when
the saboteur is informed—recall that sabotage only occurs when the incumbent is somewhat
unpopular (and the saboteur values the challenge policy more than the foregone valence).
The bottom panel depicts the results when the saboteur is informed. (For a somewhat
unpopular incumbent, we depict the mixing equilibrium described in Figure 2.) The dashed
(red) lines depict the probability that a low-quality incumbent is sabotaged, while the solid
(green) lines depict the probability that a high-quality incumbent is sabotaged. The figure
shows that the saboteur never sabotages when the incumbent is either somewhat popular or
very unpopular. For a very popular incumbent, he always sabotages low-quality incumbent,
and sabotages high quality incumbents at a decreasing rate as the probability the challenger
is of high quality increases.
Several features of the results stand out in Figure 2. First, across both versions, sabotage
never occurs in equilibrium when the incumbent is somewhat popular or very unpopular—
this result is thus robust to contexts in which a saboteur is more or less likely to know the
underlying quality of the incumbent. In contrast, the two versions make opposite predictions
when the incumbent is very popular: an uninformed saboteur will never sabotage a very
popular incumbent, while the informed saboteur always will sabotage with some probability.
(The presence of the three plausible equilibria when the incumbent is somewhat unpopular
makes comparisons across versions tricky.). Finally, while the probability of sabotage is
always smooth within a given popularity region, it is often starkly discontinuous at the
borders between regions.
Next, we can examine the incumbent’s retention probability. Figure 3 depicts the prob-
ability the incumbent is retained, as a function of the interaction of the saboteur’s effort
decision and the policy outcome. Again the top panel depicts the results with an unin-
formed saboteur, while the bottom panel depicts an informed saboteur. In both graphs, the
solid (green) line depicts the probability of retention after the bureaucrat does not sabotage
and the policy succeeds. The (red) uniform dashed line depicts the probability of retention
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Figure 2: The probability of sabotage as a function of challenger quality/popularity of the
incumbent.
after the bureaucrat does not sabotage and the policy fails. The irregular dashed (blue) line
depicts the probability of retention after sabotage.
The figure shows that again that the saboteur being informed or uninformed leads to
identical predictions when the incumbent is somewhat popular or very unpopular. In the
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Figure 3: The probability of incumbent retention, by the probability the challenger is of high
quality.
former, sabotage or policy success leads to retention, while policy failure leads to replacement.
In the latter, the incumbent is never retained.
In contrast, in the somewhat unpopular region (again based on the mixing equilibrium),
the retention probabilities are influenced by whether or not the saboteur is informed. Sabo-
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tage by an uninformed saboteur induces the voter to replace the incumbent for certain, while
its absence induces the voter to replace the incumbent only if he fails. When the incumbent
is informed, however, sabotage endogenously improves the incumbents reputation, while its
absence worsens it. Thus, although it remains true that an incumbent who fails is always
replaced, an incumbent who succeeds will also sometimes be replaced, and an incumbent who
is sabotaged will sometimes be retained. Finally, in the very popular region retention prob-
abilities are also affected by whether the saboteur is informed. In both cases, an incumbent
who is not sabotaged will be retained regardless of whether he succeeds or fails. However,
an incumbent who is sabotaged by an uninformed saboteur will also be retained, whereas an
incumbent who is sabotaged by an informed saboteur will sometimes be replaced.
5 Empirical Implications
What empirical implications can we draw from the model? On the one hand, the presence
of multiple equilibria makes it difficult to draw crisp implications from the totality of the
results. On the other hand, the model with an uninformed saboteur makes a clear prediction
about the likelihood of sabotage. Assuming a context in which the saboteur values getting
rid of an incumbent more than he values policy valence, Figure 2A shows the probability of
sabotage is non-monotonic with respect to the popularity of incumbent: it should only occur
in the “middle region” where the incumbent is somewhat unpopular but too unpopular.
In addition, we would also argue that the results under an informed saboteur do produce
new empirical insights. To see this, we return to our motivating example, the Republican
Party’s sabotage of Obamacare. As is well known, the passage of the Affordable Care Act
was highly contentious, and the bill was approved effectively on party-line vote. Perhaps
not surprisingly, public support for the law was mixed was from its inception. Figure 4
shows the proportion of Americans with a Favorable/Unfavorable/Don’t Know opinion of
the law from March 2010 to August 2018 (see the caption for the source of the data and the
exact question wording). Soon after passage, fewer than 50% of Americans approved of the
law—though this number was slightly higher than the percentage who disapproved. Thus,
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Figure 4: Public opinion on Obamacare, 2010-2018. The data comes from the Kaiser Family
Foundation (2018), which has regularly asked Americans the following question: “As you may
know, a health reform bill was signed into law in 2010. Given what you know about the health
reform law, do you have a generally favorable or generally unfavorable opinion of it?” The
solid (black) line shows the percent of respondents with a favorable opinion; the the dotted
(red) line shows the percent of respondents with an unfavorable; the bottom (purple) line
shows the percent who answer don’t know. The shaded region shows the period where Trump
has been president.
the law was at best moderately popular in this period.
As is well documented, the law faced intense and immediate opposition from the Republi-
can party. The day the House passed the bill in March 2010, Republican officials in numerous
states filed lawsuits designed to block the implementation of the bill (CNN 2010). These
challenges eventually resulted in the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (567 U.S. 519), which, while upholding the bill’s individual
mandate as constitutional, ruled unconstitutional a provision of the bill that mandated that
states expand their Medicaid program (or risk losing existing Medicaid funding.) Following
this decision, a number of states—mostly controlled by Republicans—opted not to expand
their Medicaid programs (even though the federal government would fund about 90% of the
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increased costs). This led to a “coverage gap” in non-expansion states, which resulted in an
estimated 2.2 million people not having health insurance (compared to the counter-factual
where every state took part in the expansion) (Garfield, Damico and Orgera 2018). This is
just one of a number of steps Republicans took to sabotage the law (Norris 2017).
Consider these events from the perspective of the model. As noted above, the policy
was moderately unpopular at its inception. Republicans clearly had their eye on defeating
Obama in the 2012 election—Obama himself had sufficiently moderate approval ratings that
re-election was neither assured (i.e. he was not very popular) nor highly unlikely (i.e. he
was not very unpopular). Thus, preventing the smooth implementation of Obamacare would
make it less likely that the success of the policy would help propel him to victory. At the same
time, it seems plausible that many voters nevertheless disapproved of the act of sabotaging—
yet not enough to prevent sabotage from being the optimal strategy for Republicans. This
interplay of incentives nicely illustrates the “Always Mix” equilibrium described above in
Proposition 6. Our reading is that Republicans did not sabotage because they thought doing
so would harm the incumbent’s reputation. Rather, it engaged in sabotage despite the fact
that it might improve the incumbent’s reputation, fearing that the absence of sabotage and
a policy success would improve that reputation even more.
Of course, despite these initial efforts at sabotage, Obama was re-elected in 2012. How-
ever, Republican opposition to Obamacare continued apace in his second term. With a pres-
idential election upcoming in 2016, the incentives for Republicans had not really changed.
And, indeed, Kogan and Wood (2017) present evidence suggesting that public response to
the implementation problems with Obamacare may have shifted enough votes for Trump to
defeat Hillary Clinton. (To be sure there were many “unforced errors” by the Obama admin-
istration, such as the disastrous rollout of HealthCare.gov in 2013, that also contributed
to public disapproval of the policy).
Finally, we can look to support for the law since Trump took office in January 2017.
Following his inauguration, Republicans quickly moved to repeal Obamacare (either in whole
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or in part), though the effort was narrowly defeated in July of 2017. With the transition, the
old “saboteur” and the incumbent became aligned, putting the policy in jeopardy. Notably,
public support for the law increased over this period—as seen in Figure 4, supporters of the
law now consistently outnumber opponents for the first time since 2010.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a model of policy sabotage in which the ability of a saboteur to
prevent implementation of a policy complicates a voter’s ability to select a politician who
will perform the best in office. While many of the results are intuitive, we showed that the
interaction of sabotage ability and concerns for policy valence combine to create complicated
incentives for a would-be saboteur, and a challenging informational environment for voters.
We motivated our inquiry with the following question: how can observable sabotage be
rational for an out-party if the voter understands why such sabotage is occurring? Our
model provides one answer. An opposition party does not sabotage because it thinks it will
harm an incumbent’s reputation with rational voters. Rather, it sabotages despite the fact
that sabotage will the improve the incumbent’s reputation with rational voters, fearing that
the absence of sabotage and a policy success will improve that reputation even more.
Our model, we believe, makes an important contribution to the general literature on
democratic accountability discussed in Section 1. In addition, there is a connection between
our results and a phenomenon called in the political agency literature called “gambling for
resurrection” (Downs and Rocke 1994). This occurs when a weak incumbent—that is, one
who is moderately unpopular in the language of our model—takes a risky action in the
hopes that it will turn out well and get them over the electoral threshold (Izzo 2018). (A
somewhat similar result occurs in Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001)—in their model,
only marginally popular presidents engage in pandering, in an effort to gain re-election before
it is revealed to the public that he did not act in its best interest.) In some sense, sabotage
with an uninformed saboteur is the flipside of this—although the policy is exogenous, the
equilibrium can be interpreted an intermediary trying to intervene to prevent the incumbent
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from “gambling” that the policy valence will carry him to re-election.
Our model thus makes an initial step towards understanding the politics of sabotage—
but it is surely far from the last. We chose to set our model within the broader literature
on democratic accountability. Yet other paths are available. Sabotage, for instance, may
change the status quo of a policy and/or a reversion point, thereby opening up opportunities
for future bargaining. A pivotal politics-style model could pursue this path. Alternatively,
where we modeled a single voter, sabotage may please some voters at the expense others.
Thus, a model with heterogeneous voters could produce additional insights. Finally, while
we have focused on sabotage within the context of horizontally shared powers, the logic of
our model could easily be extended to examine the incentives for sabotage in a system of
federalism where local actors have opposed preferences to national policies (Bulman-Pozen
and Gerken 2008).
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Appendix
Notation:For simplicity we henceforth write the voter’s net policy benefit for the in-
cumbent policy U (xV ;xI , xC) as UV ≥ 0 which is assumed to be positive, and write the
agent’s net benefit for the incumbent policy U (xS;xI , xC) as −US, where US ≥ 0 denotes
the agent’s net utility for the challenger policy. We also write pi00 as just pi0, pi
1
1 as piH , and pi
0
1
as piL. Finally, we suppress the explicit dependence of ∆¯λI (·) and θ¯C (·) on other quantities.
It is first helpful to show the property that ∆¯
H
> qH
qL
∆¯L, which furthermore has the
implication that ∆¯H ≤ qH → ∆¯L < qL. This eliminates much of the parameter space
and several potential types of equilibria. To see this, observe that the desired property is
equivalent to
qHγ + δ∆¯L
qH
qL
· (γ (qH − qL) (1− θC)− US) ≥ 0
or
US − γ (qH − qL) (1− θC)
US + γθC (qH − qL) ≤ 1
which clearly always holds.
A Preliminary Analysis
Equilibrium values of eL and eL in combination with the position of the policy imply
different possible restrictions on the retention probabilities pi0, piL, and piH . These in turn
imply different feasible pairs of (∆L,∆H). We first examine these feasible pairs by first
characterizing feasible ∆L and then the feasible values of ∆H given ∆L. We then subsequently
use this characterization in the equilibrium characterization.
In the subsequent case-by-base breakdown, (S) refers to “single mixing” (the principal
mixes after one path of play) while (D) refers to “double-mixing” (the principal mixes after
two paths of play).
Case S.1 (pi0 ∈ (0, 1), piL = piH = 1), We have
∆λI = 1− pi0
Therefore feasible values of ∆L are all ∆L ∈ [0, 1] and ∆H = ∆L
Case S.2 (pi0 = 0, piL = 0, piH ∈ (0, 1) ). We have
∆λI = qλIpi1,H
and it straightforward to show that ∆L ∈ [0, qL] and ∆H = qHqL ∆L.
Case S.3 (pi0 = 0, piL ∈ (0, 1), piH = 1). We have
∆λI = qλI + (1− qλI ) pi1,L
and it is straightforward to show that ∆L ∈ [qL, 1] and ∆H = qH +
(
1−qH
1−qL
)
(∆L − qL) which
is clearly < qH
qL
∆L.
Case S.4 (pi0 ∈ [0, 1], piL = 0, piH = 1). We have
∆λI = qλI − pi0
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so it is straightforward that ∆L ∈ [0, qL] and ∆H = ∆L + (qH − qL).
Case D.1 (pi0 ∈ [0, 1], piL = 0, piH ∈ [0, 1]). We have
∆λI = −pi0 + qλIpi1,H .
so it is straightforward that ∆L ∈ [0, qL]. The potential values of ∆H then fall in an interval
that we will characterize. The minimum possible value of ∆H occurs when pi0 = 0 which
is case S.2 and so ∆H =
qH
qL
∆L. The maximum possible value of ∆H occurs when when
pi1,H = 1, which is case S.4 and so the maximum value is ∆H = ∆L + (qH − qL).
Summarizing, in Case D.1 we have ∆L ∈ [0, qL] and ∆H ∈
[
qH
qL
∆L,∆L + (qH − qL)
]
Case D.2 (pi0 ∈ [0, 1], piL ∈ [0, 1], piH = 1). We have
∆λI = qλI + (1− qλI ) pi1,L − pi0
so it is straightforward that we may have any ∆L ∈ [0, 1]. The minimum possible value
of ∆H occurs when pi1,L = 1 which implies ∆H = ∆L. The maximum possible value of
∆H corresponds to the minimum possible value of pi1,L, which in turn depends on ∆L. If
∆L ∈ [0, qL] then the minimum possible value of pi1,L is 0 and we are in case S.4, so
∆H = ∆L + (qH − qL). If ∆L ∈ [qL, 1] then the minimum possible value of pi1,L must be
> 0; the smallest feasible value corresponds with when pi0 = 0, so we are in case S.3 and
∆H = qH +
(
1−qH
1−qL
)
(∆L − qL).
Summarizing, in case D.2 we have we have ∆L ∈ [0, 1] and
• if ∆L ∈ [0, qL] then ∆H = [∆L,∆L + (qH − qL)]
• if ∆L ∈ [qL, 1] then ∆H =
[
∆L, qH +
(
1−qH
1−qL
)
(∆L − qL)
]
B Equilibrium Characterization
This section proceeds by enumerating all the types of equilibria and deriving existence
conditions for each. After this analysis the equilibria are summarized as a function of the
primitive parameters. Throughout we apply the D1 refinement to the set of equilibria.
B.1 Pooling on Effort Equilibria
We consider the four popularity conditions.
A very unpopular policy (θ¯C ∈
[
θIqH
θIqH+(1−θI)qL , 1
]
) We have pi∗H = pi
∗
L = 0 and ∆L,∆L ≤
0, so it is indeed an equilibrium to pool on effort regardless of the voters off-path best
response (pi∗0 ∈ [0, 1]).
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A somewhat (un)popular policy (θ¯C ∈
[
θI(1−qH)
θI(1−qH)+(1−θI)(1−qL) ,
θIqH
θIqH+(1−θI)qL
]
) Then piH =
1 > piL = 0 and potential off path behavior is pi0 ∈ [0, 1]. Now we ask what different values
of pi0 imply for ∆L and ∆H—using case S.3 the potential values of (∆L,∆H) are ∆L ∈ [0, qL]
and ∆H ∈ ∆L + (qH − qL).
If ∆¯L ≥ qL then this is an equilibrium; we know that this implies ∆¯H ≥ qH and so
no off path beliefs can invite deviation; pi∗0 may be anything.
If ∆¯L < qL, then this is an equilibrium i.f.f. ∆¯H ≤ ∆¯L + (qH − qL). In this case, the
set of pi0 that invite deviation from a high type strictly contains the set that invite deviation
from a low type, sabotage will be perceived as perfect good news (applying D1) and cause
retention for sure so pi∗0 = 1, and will therefore be undesirable.
Finally, if ∆¯L < qL but ∆¯H > ∆¯L + (qH − qL), then again applying D1 sabotage will be
perceived as bad news or pi∗0 = 0, implying (∆L = qL,∆H = qH), the bureaucrat will want to
deviate to sabotaging both types, and this is not an equilibrium.
Summarizing, for a somewhat unpopular or somewhat popular policy, pooling on effort
is an equilibrium i.f.f.
• ∆¯L ≥ qL or ∆¯L < qL and ∆¯H ≤ ∆¯L + (qH − qL)
Equilibrium retention probabilities are pi∗H = 1, pi
∗
L = 0, and pi
∗
0 = 1.
A very popular policy (θ¯C ∈
[
0, θI(1−qH)
θI(1−qH)+(1−θI)(1−qL)
]
) No news and failure leads to
retention (piL = piH = 1). Then ∆λI = 1−pi0 so ∆L ∈ [0, 1] and ∆H = ∆L, the set of pi0 that
invite deviation from a bad type is always strictly larger than the set inviting deviation from
a good type, sabotage should be perceived as bad news and cause the policy to be tossed for
sure, so pi∗0 = 0, ∆L = ∆H = 1, sabotage will be desirable for both types and this is not an
equilibrium.
Summary Pooling on effort is an equilibrium that satisfies D1 i.f.f.
• The policy is very unpopular, so pi∗H = pi∗L = 0 and any pi∗0
• The policy is somewhat unpopular or somewhat popular (so pi∗H = 1 > pi∗L = 0), and
either ∆¯L ≥ qL (with any pi∗0) or ∆¯L < qL and ∆¯H ≤ ∆¯L + (qH − qL) (with pi∗0 = 1)
B.2 Pooling on Sabotage Equilibria
An unpopular policy (θ¯C ≤ θP ) We argue pooling on sabotage is always an equilibrium.
If the policy is unpopular then pi∗0 = 0. Recall that 0 < qL < qH < 1, so neither success
nor failure are perfectly informative. So the set of off-path feasible best responses for the
principal are both piL ∈ [0, 1] and piH = 1 (if a deviation is sufficiently likely to come from
a high type; like case S.3) or piL = 0 and piH ∈ (0, 1) (if the policy is very unpopular and a
deviation is sufficiently likely to come from a high type, or the policy is somewhat unpopular
and a deviation is sufficiently likely to come from a low type; like Case S.2).
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These two possibilities straightforwardly yield the contour of impact probabilities ∆L ∈
[0, qL] and ∆H =
qH
qL
∆L, and ∆L ∈ [qL, 1] and ∆H = qH+
(
1−qH
1−qL
)
(∆L − qL) which is < qHqL ∆L.
Since we know ∆¯
H
> qH
qL
∆¯L, this implies the set of best responses inviting deviation from
a high type is strictly larger than the set inviting deviation for a low type, implying effort
should be interpreted as good news (pi∗H = pi
∗
L = 1) and cause the policy to be retained for
sure, and is therefore an undesirable deviation, so this is an equilibrium.
A popular policy (θ¯C ≥ θP ) Then pi0 = 1 and pooling on sabotage is not an equilibrium,
since sabotage gets the policy retained for sure and also destroys valence.
C (Partially) Separating Equilibria
We begin by ruling out certain types of strategy profiles.
First, we argue that (eL > 0, eH = 0) cannot be an equilibrium (including both eL ∈ (0, 1)
and eL = 1, ruling out one type of separating equilibrium). Observe that effort is perfect bad
news and causes policy to be tossed for sure (piL = piH = 0), so it will be strictly desirable
to exert effort for both types, contradicting eH = 0.
We next argue that (eL = 1, eH < 1) cannot be an equilibrium. Observe that sabotage
is perfect good news and causes the policy to be retained for sure (pi0 = 1), so effort will
weakly decrease the chance policy is retained, so again it will be strictly desirable on both
types, contradicting eH < 1.
Last we argue that (eL = 0, eH = 1) cannot be an equilibrium; combined with the above
this rules out all separating equilibria. If so then effort perfectly reveals the incumbent
is good while sabotage perfectly reveals the incumbent is bad; then piH = piL = 1 and
pi0 = 0, but then the bureaucrat will strictly prefer to sabotage a good incumbent under our
assumptions, contradicting eH = 1.
The remaining possible equilibrium efforts are four types of partially separating equilibria:
(P1) eL = 0, eH ∈ (0, 1): effort is “perfect good news,” sabotage is “imperfect bad news”
(P2) eL ∈ (0, 1), eH = 1: effort is “perfect bad news,” sabotage is “noisy good news”
(P3) 0 < eL < eH < 1: effort is “noisy good news,” sabotage is “noisy bad news”
(P4) 0 < eH < eL < 1: effort is “noisy bad news,” sabotage is “noisy good news”
We consider each and derive conditions under which it is an equilibrium satisfying D1.
(P1) eL = 0, eH > 0 Clearly piH = piL = 1. We first argue that for this to be an
equilibirum requires the incumbent be popular or θI ≥ θ¯C . If they are unpopular then
pi0 = 0 and ∆L = ∆H = 1 and the agent will strictly prefer to sabotage a good policy,
contradicting eH > 0.
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So suppose the incumbent is popular; we argue that it is always possible to derive an
equilibrium of this form, and derive it. First, it is always possible to select eH to gener-
ate principal indifference after sabotage generating pi0 ∈ [0, 1], yielding case S.1 from the
preliminary analysis. This requires that
θ¯C =
θI (1− eH)
θI (1− eH) + (1− θI) → e
∗
H =
θI − θ¯C(
1− θ¯C
)
θI
Next, in S.1 we have ∆H = 1−pi0, so to generate saboteur indifferene with a high quality
incumbent requires
∆H = ∆¯H ⇐⇒ pi0 = 1− ∆¯H
Finally, we have ∆L = ∆H = ∆¯H > ∆¯L, so the saboteur strictly prefers to sabotage a low
quality incumbent, supporting eL = 0.
(P2) eL ∈ (0, 1) , eH = 1 We have pi0 = 0. We first argue this cannot be an equilibrium if
the incumbent is very popular. If so, then piH = piL = 1 (since effort is noisy good news), and
the saboteur will strictly prefer to sabotage a high quality incumbent, contradicting eH = 1.
Next suppose that the incumbent is somewhat (un)popular, implying that piH = 1. We
argue an equilibrium of this form exists in which piL ∈ (0, 1) i.f.f. ∆¯L ∈ [qL, 1], and derive
the equilibrium. First, it is always possible to select eL to generate principal indifference
after effort and failure so that piL ∈ (0, 1), yielding case S.3 from the preliminary analysis.
This requires that
θ¯C =
θI (1− qH)
θI (1− qH) + (1− θI) eL (1− qL) → e
∗
L =
θI (1− qH)
(1− θI) (1− qL)
/
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
Next, in S.3 we must have ∆L ∈ [qL, 1] and ∆H = qH +
(
1−qH
1−qL
)
(∆L − qL), which is clearly
< qH
qL
∆L. So ∆L = ∆¯L ⇐⇒ ∆¯L ∈ [qL, 1], the desired necessary condition. To derive piL
observe that
∆¯L = qL + (1− qL) piL ⇐⇒ piL = ∆¯L − qL
1− qL
Finally, ∆H = qH +
(
1−qH
1−qL
) (
∆¯L − qL
)
< qH
qL
∆¯L < ∆¯H , so the saboteur strictly prefers to
exert effort for a high quality incumbent, supporting eH = 1.
Finally, suppose that the incumbent is very unpopular, so eL may be chosen to generate
principal indifference after both failure (piL ∈ (0, 1) and piH = 1) or success (piL = 0 and
piH ∈ (0, 1)). Using the analysis in the somewhat (un)popular case, an equilibrium of the
former type exists i.f.f. ∆¯L ∈ [qL, 1], and the equilibrium quantities are as previously derived.
We now argue that an equilibrium of the latter type exists i.f.f. ∆¯L ∈ [0, qL]. We must select
eL to generate principal indifference after effort and success so that piH ∈ (0, 1), yielding case
S.2 from the preliminary analysis. This requires that
θ¯C =
θIqH
θIqH + (1− θI) eLqL → e
∗
L =
θIqH
(1− θI) qL
/
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
Next, in S.2 we must have that ∆L ∈ [0, qL] and ∆H = qHqL ∆L. So ∆L = ∆¯L ⇐⇒ ∆¯L ∈
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[0, qL], the desired necessary condition. To derive piH observe that
∆¯L = qLpiH ⇐⇒ piH = ∆¯L
qL
Finally, ∆H =
qH
qL
∆¯L < ∆¯H , so the saboteur strictly prefers to exert effort for a high quality
incumbent, supporting eH = 1.
Summary There exists an equilibrium with eH = 1 and eL ∈ (0, 1) i.f.f.
• The incumbent is very unpopular, somewhat unpopular, or somewhat popular and
∆¯L ∈ [qL, 1]. In the equilibrium
e∗L =
θI (1− qH)
(1− θI) (1− qL)
/
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
, pi0 = 0 < piL =
∆¯L − qL
1− qL < piH = 1
• The incumbent is very unpopular and ∆¯L ∈ [0, qL]. In the equilibrium
e∗L =
θIqH
(1− θI) qL
/
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
, pi0 = piL = 0 < piH =
∆¯L
qL
< 1
(P3) 0 < eL < eH < 1 First observe that when both eλI ∈ (0, 1) ∀λI we cannot have
piH ∈ (0, 1) and piL ∈ (0, 1) since voter posterior beliefs after success are always strictly
higher than posteriors after failure (unless effort is perfectly informative). Thus to generate
saboteur mixing for both incumbent types requires pi0 ∈ (0, 1) and either 0 = piL < piH < 1
(case D.1) or 0 < piL < 1 = piH (case D.2).
We first argue that for an equilibrium with 0 < eL < eH < 1 the following conditions are
necessary and sufficient: (a) the incumbent is somewhat popular (θ¯C ∈
[
θI ,
θIqH
θIqH+(1−θI)qL
]
),
(b) reelection probabilities are as in case D.2 (0 < piL < 1 = piH), (c) ∆¯L ∈ [0, qL], and (d)
∆¯H ∈
[
∆¯H , ∆¯L + (qH − qL)
]
.
If instead the incumbent were very popular then piH = piL = 1, a contradiction; if the
incumbent were unpopular then pi0 = 0, also a contradiction. Finally, if the incumbent is
somewhat popular then piH = 1, so reelection probabilities must be as in case D.2.
Now if the incumbent if somewhat popular then it is always possible to select (eL, eH) to
generate principal indifference after both sabotage and effort and failure. Equilibrium effort
levels solve the following system of equations:
θIeH (1− qH)
θIeH (1− qH) + (1− θI) eL (1− qL) =
1
1 + (1−θI)eL(1−qL)
θIeH(1−qH)
= θ¯C
=
θI (1− eH)
θI (1− eH) + (1− θI) (1− eL) =
1
1 + (1−θI)(1−eL)
θI(1−eH)
which yields
eL
eH
=
(
1− qH
1− qL
)(
θI
1− θI
/
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
)
and
1− eL
1− eH =
θI
1− θI
/
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
Solving then yields
e∗L =
(
1− qH
qH − qL
) (
θI − θ¯C
)
θ¯C (1− θI)
and e∗H =
(
1− qL
qH − qL
) (
θI − θ¯C
)
θI
(
1− θ¯C
) .
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Finally, for the saboteur to mix on both types of incumbents requires that ∆L = ∆¯L and
∆H = ∆¯H . We argue this implies ∆¯L ∈ [0, qL], which in turn implies ∆¯H ∈
[
∆¯L, ∆¯L + (qH − qL)
]
from the preliminary analysis of case D.2. If instead ∆¯L ∈ [qL, 1] then we must have
∆¯H ∈
[
∆¯L, qH +
(
1−qH
1−qL
) (
∆¯L − qL
)]
(again from the preliminary analysis), but ∆¯H >
qH
qL
∆¯L > qH +
(
1−qH
1−qL
) (
∆¯L − qL
)
, a contradiction. Finally, in case D.2 the retention proba-
bilities are defined by the system (pi1,L − pi0) + qλI (1− pi1,L) = ∆¯λI ∀λI and we have
piL =
(
qH − ∆¯H
)− (qL − ∆¯L)
qH − qL and pi0 =
(1− qL)
(
qH − ∆¯H
)− (1− qH) (qL − ∆¯H)
qH − qL
(P4) 0 < eH < eL < 1 We first argue that: (a) the incumbent must be somewhat unpopular
(θ¯C ∈
[
θP (1−qH)
θP (1−qH)+(1−θP )(1−qL) , θI
]
), (b) reelection probabilities are as in case D.1 (pi0 ∈ (0, 1)
and 0 = piL < piH < 1), (c) ∆¯L ∈ [0, qL], and (d) ∆¯H ≤ ∆¯L + (qH − qL).
As in the analysis in (P3) we must have pi0 ∈ (0, 1) and either 0 = piL < piH < 1 (case D.1)
or 0 < piL < 1 = piH (case D.2). If the incumbent were very unpopular then we would have
piL = piH = 0, a contradiction; if she were popular we would have pi0 = 1, also a contradiction;
she must therefore be somewhat unpopular, further implying 0 = piL < piH < 1 (case D.1).
Now if the incumbent if somewhat unpopular then it is always possible to select (eL, eH)
to generate principal indifference after both sabotage and effort and failure. Equilibrium
effort levels solve the following system of equations:
θIeHqH
θIeHqH + (1− θI) eLqL =
1
1 + (1−θI)eLqL
θIeHqH
= θ¯C
=
θI (1− eH)
θI (1− eH) + (1− θI) (1− eL) =
1
1 + (1−θI)(1−eL)
θI(1−eH)
which yields
eL
eH
=
qH
qL
·
(
θI
1− θI
/
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
)
and
1− eL
1− eH =
θI
1− θI
/
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
Solving yields the interior solution
e∗L: =
(
qH
qH − qL
) (
θ¯C − θI
)
θ¯C (1− θI)
and e∗H =
(
qL
qH − qL
) (
θ¯C − θI
)
θI
(
1− θ¯C
)
Finally, for the saboteur to mix on both types of incumbents requires that ∆L = ∆¯L and
∆H = ∆¯H . From the preliminary analysis of case D.1 this immediately implies ∆¯L ∈ [0, qL]
and ∆¯H ∈
[
∆¯L, ∆¯L + (qH − qL)
]
. The retention probabilities are defined by the system
−pi0 + qλIpi1,H = ∆¯λI ∀λI which yields
pi∗1,H =
∆¯H − ∆¯L
qH − qL and pi
∗
0 =
qL∆¯H − qH∆¯L
qH − qL
D Additional Proofs
We now provide additional proofs that support stated results in the main text.
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Sufficient condition for ∆¯H ≤ ∆¯L + (qH − qL)
We prove that the inequality in the equilibrium statements for a somewhat (un)popular
is a sufficient condition for both ∆¯L ≤ qL and ∆¯H ≤ ∆¯L+(qH − qL). These latter properties
substantially simplify the equilibrium characterization by eliminating many possibilities.
From the definitions we have that
qλI = δ∆¯λp
(
US
γS
− (1λI=H − θC) (qH − qL)
)
which is equivalent to
qλI + δ∆¯λp (qH − qL) = δ∆¯λp
(
US
γS
+ θC (qH − qL)
)
Also observe that that ∆¯λp ≤ ∆λp ⇐⇒
US
γS
≥ (1λI=H − θC) (qH − qL) +
1
δ
qλI
∆λp
Now define ∆ˆH to be the quantity satisfying
qH + δqH (qH − qL) = δ∆ˆH
(
US
γS
+ θC (qH − qL)
)
or
qH (1 + δ (qH − qL)) = δ∆ˆH
(
US
γS
+ θC (qH − qL)
)
From the definitions, any value of ∆ˆH corresponding to a value of ∆¯H < qH must satisfy
∆¯H < ∆ˆH . It is also straightforward to see that
∆ˆH
∆¯L
=
qH (1 + δ (qH − qL))
qL
⇐⇒ ∆ˆH = qH (1 + δ (qH − qL))
qL
∆¯L
We now consider when we have ∆ˆH ≤ ∆¯L + (qH − qL); this requires
qH (1 + δ (qH − qL))
qL
∆¯L ≤ ∆¯L + (qH − qL) ⇐⇒ ∆¯L ≤ qL
1 + qHδ
(which is stronger than ∆¯L ≤ qL). From the definition this condition is equivalent to:
US
γS
≥ 1
δ
+ (1− θC) (qH − qL) + qL
Further, it is also easily verified that ∆¯H ≤ qH ⇐⇒
US
γS
≥ 1
δ
+ (1− θC) (qH − qL)
which is a weaker condition, so when the stated condition holds we have ∆¯H < ∆ˆH <
∆¯L + (qH − qL) and this is sufficient for the desired properties. Finally, if we would like the
condition to hold for all values of θC then we require
US
γS
≥ 1
δ
+ qH .
Proof of Proposition 2
Voter strategies are straightforward.
To see the incumbent strategy, it is straightforward that the saboteur will never sabo-
tage when the incumbent is very (un)popular (since doing so would have no effect on the
probability of retention) or when the saboteur is somewhat popular (since sabotage would
be counterproductive and ensure retention).
If the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, the net benefit of exerting effort simply the
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expected value of the net benefit for each incumbent type:
(1− θI) (qLγS + δqL (V (0, θC ; γS, q) + U (xS;xI , xC)))
+θI (qHγS + δqH (V (1, θC ; γS, q) + U (xS;xI , xC)))
and the saboteur will sabotage i.f.f. this is ≤ 0.
This expression may be rewritten as
((1− θI) qL + θIqH)
(
1
δ
− θC (qH − qL) + U (xS;xI , xC)
γS
)
+ θIqH (qH − qL) ≤ 0
which in turn is easily rearranged to the expression in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
Follows immediately from the equilibrium characterization.
Proof of Proposition 4
By the equilibrium characterization there are three equilibria satisfying D1: (1) pooling
on effort, (2) pooling on sabotage, and (3) the partially separating equilibrium (P2) with
eH = 1 and eL ∈ (0, 1); the assumption also yields 0 = pi0 = piL < piH < 1.
We now argue that pooling on effort is Pareto dominant. Pareto dominance of pooling on
effort to pooling on sabotage is straightforward; both involve the incumbent being replaced
with probability 1, and holding retention decisions fixed both players prefer higher effort to
lower effort.
We next compare pooling on effort to (P2). With pooling on effort, we have piL = piH = 0
and the incumbent is always replaced. In (P2), we have equilibrium (pi∗0, pi
∗
L, pi
∗
H) and (e
∗
L, e
∗
H).
To see that the saboteur strictly prefers the equilibrium with pooling on effort, observe
that the retention probabilities yield indifference over effort on a low quality incumbent,
so the saboteur gets the same utility by deviating to pooling on effort (eL = 1, eH = 1)
with (pi∗0, pi
∗
L, pi
∗
H), which involves retention with strictly positive probability and is therefore
strictly worse.
To see that the voter strictly prefers the equilibrium with pooling on effort, observe
that the voter still gets her equilibrium utility by deviating to always replace given the
bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort levels, which in turn is worse than always replacing with
maximum effort by the bureaucrat.
Proof of Proposition 5
By the equilibrium characterization and the assumption that −U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
≥ 1
δ
+ qH there
are three equilibria satisfying D1: (1) the partially separating equilibrium (P1) with eL = 0
and eH ∈ (0, 1), 0 < pi0 < 1 = piL = piH , (2) pooling on effort (0 = piL < piH = 1), and (3)
the partially separating equilibrium (P3) with 0 < eL < eH < 1 and pi0 ∈ (0, 1), piL ∈ (0, 1),
piH = 1.
We first compare pooling on effort to (P3). For the saboteur, in (P3) a deviation to
pooling on effort would still yield her equilibrium utility but with pi∗L > 0, so her equilibrium
utility is strictly worse in (P3).
For the voter, we make a sequence of changes altering the strategy profile in (P3) to
that in the pooling on effort that each weakly increase her equilibrium utility. First, chang-
ing from
(
piP30 ∈ (0, 1) , piP3L ∈ (0, 1) , piH = 1; eP3L , eP3H
)
to
(
pi0 = piL = piH = 1; e
P3
L , e
P3
H
)
does
not change the voter’s utility due to the (P3) indifference conditions. Next changing to
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(pi0 = piL = piH = 1; eL = eH = 1) strictly increases the voters’s utility since first period qual-
ity increases with no change in selection. Finally, changing to (0 = piL < pi0 = piH = 1; eL = eH = 1)
strictly increases the voter’s utility since replacement is strictly optimal after failure when
effort is uninformative.
We next compare (P3) to (P1). For the saboteur, a deviation to the both equilibrium
effort levels in (P1) would yield her (P3) equilibrium utility holding retention probabilities
fixed. We next argue that the equilibrium retention probabilities in P1 are uniformly higher,
implying that the saboteur is worse off in the (P1) equilibrium than in the (P3) equilibrium.
Clearly retention probabilities are higher in (P1) after success and failure; we need only
argue that the retention probability is also higher after sabotage. From the equilibrium
characterizations we have that
piP10 = 1− ∆¯H and piP30 =
(
qH + (1− qH)piP3L
)− ∆¯H
which shows the desired property since qH + (1− qH) piP3L < 1.
For the voter, a deviation to always retain in (P1) still yields her (P1) equilibrium utility,
and a deviation to always retain in (P3) still yields her (P3) equilibrium utility. Thus, it
sufficies to show eP3λP > e
P1
λP
∀λP . We immediately have eP3L > 0 = eP3L . In addition, in both
equilibria pi0 ∈ (0, 1) requires
θI (1− eH)
(1− θI) (1− eL) =
θ¯C
1− θ¯C
,
but this immediately yields eP3L > e
P1
L → eP3H > eP1H .
Proof of Proposition 6
By the equilibrium characterization and the assumption that −U(xS ;xI ,xC)
γS
≥ 1
δ
+ qH there
are three equilibria satisfying D1: (a) pooling on sabotage, (b) pooling on effort, and (c) the
partially separating equilibrium (P4) with 0 < eH < eL < 1.
Saboteur
We first show that the saboteur prefers pooling on sabotage to (P4) to pooling on effort.
To see that the saboteur strictly prefers pooling on sabotage to (P4), observe that deviat-
ing from her P4 strategy profile to pooling on sabotage yields her equilibrium utility due to
the equilibrium indifference conditions; however, this involves the incumbent retained with
strictly positive probability, and is therefore strictly worse than the equilibrium with pooling
on sabotage in which the incumbent is replaced for sure.
To see that the saboteur strictly prefers (P4) to pooling on effort, observe that deviating
from her (P4) strategy to pooling on effort yields her equilibrium utility, but the incumbent
is retained after success with probability piP4H < 1; this is thus strictly better than the
equilibrium with pooling on effort in which an incumbent who succeeds is retained for sure.
Voter
We now show that the voter prefers pooling on effort to P4 to pooling on sabotage.
To see that the voter strictly prefers pooling on effort to (P4), we make a sequence of
changes altering the strategy profile in (P4) to that in the pooling on effort equilibrium that
each weakly increase her utility. First, changing from
(
piP40 ∈ (0, 1) , piP4L = 0, piP4H ∈ (0, 1) ; eP4L , eP4H
)
to
(
pi0 = piL = piH = 0; e
P4
L , e
P4
H
)
does not change the voter’s utility due to the (P4) indif-
ference conditions. Next changing to (pi0 = piL = piH = 0; eL = eH = 1) strictly increases the
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voters’s utility since first period quality increases with no change in selection. Finally, chang-
ing to (0 = piL = pi0 < piH = 1; eL = eH = 1) strictly increases the voter’s utility since reten-
tion is strictly optimal after success when effort is uninformative.
To see that the voter strictly prefers (P4) to pooling on sabotage, observe that a deviation
in (P4) to pi0 = piL = piH = 0 (always replace) does not change her utility, which involves
strictly positive effort levels; this is thus strictly better for the voter than the pooling on
sabotage equilibrium which also involves always replacing, but with no effort.
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